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WHY CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS SHOULD 
STUDY TAX 
INTRODUCTION 
Stephen Cohen· 
Laura Sager·· 
Civil rights and income taxation may seem as far apart as any two le-
gal subjects could be, but they actually intersect in a surprising number of 
significant ways. Consider the following examples. 
(1) A civil rights clinic taught by one of us uses the following tax prob-
lem: Your client has sued her employer for sex discrimination, including 
sexual harassment involving unwanted physical contact. The employer 
has offered to settle the lawsuit for $100,000. If the offer is accepted, what 
are the tax consequences to your client? Specifically, must your client treat 
the damages as taxable income or are the damages exempt from income 
taxation? 
(2) We were recently consulted about a novel tax problem concerning 
minority homeowners victimized by predatory home mortgage lending. 
The lending institutions conceded that the homeowners should not have 
to repay the full amount due under the terms of the mortgage loan. How-
ever, the homeowners now had a tax problem. Longstanding tax princi-
ples require that a borrower report as taxable income the amount of debt 
that is forgiven, and the IRS was therefore asserting that the homeowners 
must report the forgiven amount of the home mortgage loans as taxable 
income. 
(3) An income tax course taught by one of us asks whether tax benefits 
might in some circumstances offend the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause or the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. This 
question arises, for example, when the government provides tax-exempt 
status to private schools and religious institutions. 
This Article discusses the intersection of civil rights law and income 
taxation in the three areas listed above: damages for unlawful discrimina-
tion, the forgiveness of debt by a predatory lender, and tax-exempt status 
for private educational and religious institutions. Our purpose is not to 
attempt an exhaustive examination of the issues in each area but to con-
vey a sense of the range of tax problems that civil rights lawyers may 
need to confront. 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. 
** Clinical Professor of Law, New York University School of Law 
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1. DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION 
In deciding whether to file or settle a claim for unlawful discrimina-
tion, civil rights lawyers and their clients need to assess the after-tax value of 
potential damages. That value depends, in tum, on the extent to which 
damages will be subject to income taxation. One hundred thousand dol-
lars in damages that are exempt from tax obviously have a much greater 
value than $100,000 in damages that are taxed in fulL Thus, civil rights law-
yers representing victims of unlawful discrimination need to be acutely 
aware of the tax treatment of discrimination damages. 
Since 1996, the Internal Revenue Code has drawn a sharp distinction 
between damages for physical and nonphysical injury. Under § 104(a)(2),1 
damages for lost earnings or pain and suffering received on account of 
"personal physical injuries or physical sickness" are excluded from taxa-
tion. On the other hand, damages for lost earnings or pain and suffering 
received on account of a nonphysical injury are subject to the general rule 
of § 61(a) that "gross income [includes] all income from whatever source 
derived" and therefore are subject to taxation.2 
The dramatic difference in the treatment of such damages depending 
on whether the injury is physical or nonphysical seems arbitrary and un-
fair. The distinction is especially troubling because its principal effect is to 
impose a greater tax burden on victims of civil rights violations, including 
unlawful discrimination, than on victims of physical injury.3 It seems arbi-
trary and unfair, for example, that damages for sexual harassment are 
taxed4 if damages for a broken leg are tax-exempt. 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references in the text and footnotes are to the 
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.s.C (2005). 
Nina Pillard and Ethan Yale provided insightful comments on an earlier draft of 
this Article. 
2. Regardless of whether the personal injury is physical or nonphysical, punitive dam-
ages are taxed and compensation for medical expenses is excluded. Punitive dam-
ages received on account of a physical injury are not eligible for the § 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion because the provision explicitly refers to "any damages (other than punitive dam-
ages)" (emphasis added). Thus, punitive damages for physical injury (as well for a non-
physical injury) are subject to the general rule of § 61(a) that "gross income [includes] 
all income from whatever source derived" and therefore are subject to taxation. 
Compensation for medical expenses for a physical personal injury is specifically ex-
cluded from taxation by the reference in § 104(a)(2) to "any damages (other than pu-
nitive damages)." Compensation for medical expenses for a nonphysical personal in-
jury is excluded from taxation by virtue of the following language in § 104(a): 
"[E]motional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. 
The preceding sentence shall not apply to an amount of damages not in excess of the 
amount paid for medical care ... attributable to emotional distress." The statutory 
language would be clearer if it contained an affirmative statement that emotional dis-
tress shall be treated as a physical injury or sickness to the extent of damages attrib-
utable to the amount paid for medical care for emotional distress. 
3. See Rev. Rul. 9~, 1996-2 CB. 6 (noting that the effect of the 1996 revision of § 104(a)(2) 
is to tax damages for back pay and emotional distress based on an employment dis-
crimination claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
4. Sexual harassment in the workplace is considered a form of employment discrimina-
tion based on sex under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.s.C § 2000e 
(2000). See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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Below, we discuss tax policy considerations, review the history of the 
taxation of personal injury damages, and then explore the possibility of 
characterizing discrimination as a physical injury or sickness so that the 
recovery of damages for the injury of discrimination may be excluded 
from taxation under § 104(a)(2). 
A. Tax Policy Considerations 
Both the exclusion of damages for lost earnings in the case of physical 
injury and the taxation of damages for pain and suffering in the case of non-
physical injury are difficult to defend on tax policy grounds. The ordinary 
rule that governs the taxation of damages received after trial or settlement 
of a legal claim (in business tort and contract disputes, for example), is 
that "recoveries are taxable if they compensate for amounts that would 
have been taxable if received in due course,"s but are excludable if they 
"compensate for loss of a right that would otherwise have been enjoyed 
tax-free."6 As explained in the leading case on the issue of taxing damages, 
Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, "the question to be asked is 'In 
lieu of what were the damages awarded?'''7 
Application of this "in lieu of" principle to personal injury damages 
for lost earnings or pain and suffering would have the following results. 
Damages for lost earnings would be taxable since earnings are ordinarily 
taxed. In contrast, damages for pain and suffering (or emotional distress) 
would be excluded because such damages compensate the victim for the 
loss of non-market rights that produce psychic benefits and that, absent 
the injury, are tax-exempt. 
From a tax policy perspective, the current tax treatment of personal in-
jury damages is anomalous in two respects. First, lost earnings paid to the 
victim of a physical injury are excluded from taxation, although the earn-
ings would have been taxable absent the physical injurY and although 
lost earnings paid.to the victim of a nonphysical injury are taxable.9 Sec-
ond, damages for the emotional suffering caused by a nonphysical injury 
are taxable,lO although such damages compensate for a right that, absent 
the injury, would be enjoyed tax-free,!l and although damages for the pain 
and suffering of a physical injury remain tax-exempt.12 
As explained in the following Section, the exclusion of lost earnings paid 
to the victim of a personal injury became a fixture of the early twentieth-
century income tax and until recently applied to both physical and non-
physical injuries alike. The distinction between physical and nonphysical 
5. BORIS I. BI1TKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFTS'J[ 13.1.4 (3d ed. 1999). 
6. Id. 'J[ 5.6. 
7. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944) (internal citations 
omitted). 
8. § 61(a)(I). 
9. §§ 61(a)(I), 104(a)(2). 
10. Id. 
11. Psychic benefits are not subject to taxation. See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of In-
come-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig 
ed., 1921). 
12. § 104(a)(2). 
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injury damages, however, is relatively recent, having been enacted only in 
1996. 
B. Brief History of the Taxation of Personal Injury Damages 
Congress enacted the modem income tax in 1913. Five years later, in 
1918, at the Treasury's request, Congress enacted the predecessor of 
§ 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code to provide explicitly for exclu-
sion of "any damages received ... on account of [personal] injuries or 
sickness."13 Four years later, in 1922, the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled 
that damages for the nonphysical injuries of alienation of affection and 
defamation were covered by the exclusion and therefore were exempt 
from income taxation.14 
For nearly seventy years, the interpretation of § 104(a)(2) as excluding 
from taxation both physical and nonphysical personal injury damages 
alike remained virtually unchanged. Moreover, with the enactment in the 
1960s of comprehensive federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws 
affording private rights to sue, taxpayers began to assert that damages 
received for discrimination claims were excludable under § 104(a)(2).ls Fed-
eral courts of appeal generally ruled that damages in discrimination cases 
for lost earnings as well as for pain and suffering qualified for exclusion 
from taxation.16 The courts cited earlier revenue rulings and judicial deci-
sions that excluded damages received on account of nonphysical torts, 
particularly Roemer v. Commissioner17 and Threlkeld v. Commissioner,18 which 
held that awards for the nonphysical injuries of defamation and malicious 
prosecution qualified as personal injury damages under § 104(a)(2). Ap-
plying the reasoning of Roemer and Threlkeld to the issue of taxing dam-
ages in discrimination cases, courts repeatedly held that the right not to 
suffer discrimination is a personal right,19 and that discrimination is there-
fore a personal injury, analogous to traditional common-law torts for both 
physical and nonphysical harm.20 Accordingly, these courts held that dam-
13. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919). 
14. Sol. Op. 132,1922-1 CB. 92. 
15. The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits ruled that damages for discrimination were ex-
cludable. See Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991) (back wages in set-
tlement of a pre-1991 Title VII gender discrimination claim); Metzger v. Comm'r, 88 
T.C 834 (1987) (damages for claims of discrimination in employment on the basis of 
gender and national origin under a variety of federal laws, including § 1981 and Title 
VII), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Rickel v. Comm'r, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(damages in settlement of claims of age discrimination in employment); Pistillo v. 
Comm'r, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990) (back pay awarded in trial of age discrimination 
claim); Redfield v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991) (back pay awarded 
in trial of age discrimination claim). For a contrary result, see Sparrow v. Comm'r, 949 
F.2d 434 (D.C Cir. 1991) (damages received in settlement of Title VII employment 
discrimination claim were taxable). 
16. See supra note 15. 
17. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). 
18. 87 T.C 1294, 1308 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). 
19. See, e.g., Threlkeld, 87 T.C at 1308 (the right not to suffer discrimination is based on 
"rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the 
law"). 
20. The courts also cited other instances in which damages for violation of constitutional 
or statutory rights were held to be excludable. See, e.g., Bent v. Comm'r, 835 F.2d 67 
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ages in discrimination cases, like damages for common-law torts, are ex-
cluded from taxation.21 
In 1992 and 1995, however, the Supreme Court ruled in two employ-
ment discrimination cases that damages for lost earnings were not re-
ceived on account of personal injury and were therefore taxable.22 In the 
first case, United States v. Burke, the Court looked to Treas. Reg. § 1.104-
l(c), which states that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies to damages based 
on a "tort or tort type" right.23 Tort victims, the Court stated, are often com-
pensated for "a broad range of damages,"24 including medical expenses, 
lost earnings, and pain and suffering, as well as punitive damages.25 The 
Court therefore held that whether or not a claim is based on a "tort or tort 
type" right depends on the kinds of remedies that may be awarded for 
that claim26 and that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applied only if the victim 
was afforded a "broad range of damages."27 
In the second decision, Commissioner v. Schleier, the Supreme Court re-
stricted even further the application of § 104(a)(2) to damages in civil 
rights cases by reinterpreting the exclusion to incorporate two separate 
requirements.28 First, like Burke, Schleier emphasized that § 104(a)(2) ap-
plied only to a tort or tort-type claim and that such a claim was dis tin-
(3d Cir. 1987) (holding that damages, including back wages, in settlement of a § 1983 
claim for violation of First Amendment rights were excludable); Byrne v. Comm'r, 
883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that damages, including back wages, for Federal 
Labor Standards Act claim were on account of personal injury and therefore exclud-
able). 
21. See supra note 20. 
22. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.s. 323 (1995). 
23. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234. 
24. Id. at 235. 
25. Id. at 235, 237. In addition, the Court noted, tort victims are ordinarily entitled to a 
trial by jury. See id. at 238. 
26. Id. at 234--37. The Court also stated: 
A "tort" has been defined broadly as a "civil wrong, other than breach of con-
tract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for 
damages." See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts 2 (1984). Remedial principles thus figure prominently in the 
definition and conceptualization of torts. 
Id. at 234. 
Prior to Burke, the federal appellate courts had generally construed "tort or tort 
type" rights to mean rights other than those based in contract, namely, "rights that 
an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law." Threlkeld, 
87 T.e. at 1308. See also Roemer v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d at 700 (defamation of an individ-
ual under California law is a personal injury, damages for which are excludable from 
gross income under § 104). 
27. Burke, 504 U.S. at 235, 237. In Burke, female employees of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority filed a sex discrimination claim against their employer under the pre-1991 
version of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 230-31. Damages under pre-
1991 Title VII, which applied to the Burke claim, were limited to back pay and injunc-
tive relief, and plaintiffs were not entitled to seek damages for pain and suffering or 
punitive damages. Id. at 238-39. In light of these limitations, the Court held that the 
sex discrimination claim in Burke did not assert a "tort or tort type" right, and that 
the amount received in settlement of the back pay claim was therefore not excludable 
under § 104(a)(2). Id. at 241-42. 
28. 515 U.S. 323, 323 (1995). 
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guished by the available remedies.29 However, the Court in Schleier shifted 
the inquiry away from the Burke criterion-the general availability of a 
"broad range of damages"30-to focus on the specific availability of dam-
ages for pain and suffering.31 
In addition, Schleier articulated a second and independent ground for 
its decision that the damages in that case were not "received on account 
of personal injuries" for the purposes of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.32 The 
taxpayer, a pilot, had filed an Age Discrimination in Employment claim 
for lost wages against his former employer, United Airlines, which had 
fired him when he reached age sixty.33 The taxpayer, the Court stated, may 
have suffered a personal injury, namely emotional distress as a result of 
being fired. However, the loss of his job was not itself a direct result of 
such a personal injury. Rather, it was the firing of the taxpayer on account 
of age that caused the loss of employment. Thus, the Court concluded: 
"Whether one treats [the taxpayer's] attaining the age of 60 or his being 
laid off on account of his age as the proximate cause of [the taxpayer's] 
loss of income, neither the birthday nor the discharge can fairly be de-
scribed as a 'personal injury' or 'sickness."'34 In other words, damages for 
lost earnings in Schleier were not "received on account of personal injury," 
because a personal injury (in that case, possible emotional distress) did 
not cause the victim to lose his job and in tum lose wages.35 In effect, the 
Court interpreted "received on account of personal injury" to require that 
damages compensate the victim either for a physical or mental injury or 
for other harm that is a direct consequence of such physical or mental in-
jury. 
In 1996, one year after the Court's decision in Schleier, Congress 
amended the Code to restrict the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to cases of personal 
physical injury or sickness.36 Notwithstanding the 1996 amendment re-
stricting the availability of § 104(a)(2), the holdings in Burke and Schleier, 
as explained below, may continue to be relevant for cases that involve 
both a discrimination claim and a physical injury. 
C. Can Discrimination Ever Qualify as a Physical Personal Injury? 
As a matter of semantics, the critical phrase in § 104(a)(2), "personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness/' could include physical symptoms, 
such as an ulcer or migraine headaches, that result from emotional dis-
tress. However, both the statute and the legislative history rule out the 
29. Id. at 337; Burke, 504 U.s. at 235. 
30. Burke, 504 U.S. at 235. 
31. Schleier, 515 U.s. at 335. Available remedies under the ADEA were somewhat broader 
than those afforded to the Burke taxpayers under the pre-1991 version of TItle VIT. See 
29 U.s.c. § 626 (1988) (amended 1991). In addition to back pay, the ADEA allowed 
liquidated damages in cases of willful discrimination. Id. 
32. 515 U.s. at 323. 
33. [d. at 324. 
34. [d. at 330. 
35. Therefore, damages in Schleier were "completely independent of the existence or 
extent of any personal injury." [d. at 330. 
36. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a}, 110 Stat. 
1838. 
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possibility that the physical symptoms of emotional distress will by them-
selves constitute a physical injury or sickness for purposes of § 104(a)(2). 
Section 104(a)(2) specifically provides that "emotional distress shall not be 
treated as a physical injury or physical sickness." In addition, the Confer-
ence Report on the legislation states, "[i]t is intended that the term emo-
tional distress includes symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, stomach 
disorders) which may result from such emotional distress."37 Thus, the 
current version of § 104(a)(2) would not exclude from taxation "damages 
received ... based on a claim of ... discrimination ... accompanied by a 
claim of emotional distress."38 
There has, however, been no further elaboration of the meaning of the 
term "physical injuries or physical sickness" in either the regulations or 
the case law. The only interpretation available comes from an IRS ruling 
on the question of what kind of physical contact will qualify as a "physi-
cal injury" for purposes of § 104(a)(2). Private Letter Ruling 2000-41-022 
states that physical contact will constitute a physical injury if it results in 
"observable harms," such as "bruises" or "cutS."39 The ruling involves the 
settlement of an employee's claims against an employer for sex discrimi-
nation under federal and state law and for battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress under state law. 
The ruling discusses three separate incidents of sexual harassment. In 
the first incident, the employer touched the employee without causing 
"any observable bodily harm ... to [the employee's] body" or "extreme 
pain to [the employee]."40 In the second incident, the employer assaulted 
the employee causing extreme pain to the employee. In the third incident, 
the employer assaulted the employee, cutting and biting the employee, as 
a result of which the employee "suffered skin discoloration and swelling 
accompanied by extreme pain for which [the employee] received medical 
treatment from a doctor."41 
After noting that the term "personal physical injuries" is not defined 
by the Code, the ruling states that" direct unwanted or uninvited physical 
contacts resulting in observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swell-
ing, and bleeding are personal physical injuries under § 104(a)(2)."42 Thus, 
the ruling concludes that the damages attributable to the third incident 
were received on account of physical personal injury and were therefore 
excludable from income under § 104(a)(2). The ruling goes on to conclude 
that the first incident did not constitute a physical injury since it "did not 
result in any observable harms (e.g., bruises, cuts, etc.) to A's body or 
cause A pain."43 
37. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 369 n.56 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.5.C.C.A.N. 
1677, 1861 n.56. 
38. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41-022 (Oct. 13,2000) (quoting H.R. REp. No. 104-737, at 369 
n.56). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41-022 (Oct. 13,2000) (quoting H.R. REp. No. 104-737, at 369 
n.56). 
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The ruling, however, declines to state whether the second incident 
constituted a "physical injury." Although noting that the second incident 
neither caused observable bodily harm nor required medical treatment-
which presumably would have been sufficient to cause it to be classified 
as a physical injury-the Private Letter Ruling states: 
Because the perception of pain is essentially subjective, it is a fac-
tual matter. Therefore, ... we cannot rule whether damages prop-
erly allocable to [the second incident] were received on account of 
personal physical injuries or physical sickness.44 
Although failing to reach a definitive conclusion regarding the second inci-
dent on the facts presented, the ruling implies that physical contact that 
causes extreme pain may constitute a "personal physical injury" even if 
there is no "observable bodily harm." 
The private letter ruling therefore does indicate the IRS's view that a 
civil rights claim may qualify as a personal physical injury if the discrimina-
tory acts involve physical contact that requires medical treatment or 
causes extreme physical pain. Such instances, although relatively infre-
quent and restricted largely to cases involving sexual harassment, never-
theless do afford the opportunity for obtaining tax-free treatment for civil 
rights damages for pain and suffering. However, even if there is physical 
contact amounting to physical injury, there is also the further question of 
whether damages are received "on account of" such physical injury un-
der the Supreme Court's ruling in Schleier, which preceded the amend-
ment restricting § 104(a)(2) to physical injuries or sickness. 
To illustrate, suppose that a plaintiff files a sex discrimination claim 
alleging that she was fired after rebuffing sexual harassment including 
physical contact that amounts to physical injury under the criteria of Pri-
vate Letter Ruling 2000-41-022. Damages for pain and suffering caused by 
the physical contact should be eligible for exclusion under § 104(a)(2) be-
cause the physical contact qualifies as a physical injury and the damages 
are received on account of that injury under Schleier. In addition, if the plain-
tiff missed work because of the physical injury, then damages for back 
pay are also received on account of that injury and therefore should also 
be excludable. 
However, if the plaintiff also missed work because of the discrimina-
tory firing, then damages for lost pay to that extent appear to be taxable 
under Schleier. Although a personal physical injury has occurred, such 
damages are received, under Schleier's arguably scholastic reasoning, not 
on account of the injury but on account of the discrimination. Similarly, 
damages awarded for emotional distress caused by being fired are not 
received on account of a physical injury under Schleier and are therefore 
not excludable from taxation under § 104(a)(2). 
The fact that § 104(a)(2), as interpreted by the IRS and the courts, makes 
such fine distinctions in the example above-between emotional distress 
caused by the physical contact and emotional distress caused by being 
fired and between lost wages attributable to the physical contact and lost 
wages attributable to being fired-reinforces the conclusion that the cur-
44. [d. 
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rent tax rules make little sense and should be replaced. As indicated 
above, it would be more in keeping with the "in lieu of" principle, which 
governs the taxation of other damages, to abolish the distinction between 
physical and nonphysical injuries and to exempt from taxation all dam-
ages for pain and suffering (or emotional distress) while taxing all dam-
ages for lost wages. Whether such changes occur, civil rights lawyers need to 
remain attentive to how taxation affects the after-tax value of recoveries 
for unlawful discrimination. 
II. PREDATORY LENDING 
Civil rights lawyers increasingly represent minority homeowners who 
have been victimized by predatory home mortgage lending. When civil 
rights lawyers succeed in getting lending institutions to concede that the 
full amount of a predatory loan need not be repaid, their clients may have 
a tax problem. Longstanding tax principles require that a borrower report 
as taxable income the amount of debt that is forgiven, and the IRS has as-
serted that a homeowner must report the forgiven amount of a predatory 
home mortgage loan as taxable income. Below, we discuss the nature and 
growth of predatory lending to minority homeowners, arguments under 
current law that forgiveness of a predatory loan should not produce tax-
able income, and a proposed revision of the Internal Revenue Code to 
prevent the forgiveness of a predatory home loan from creating taxable 
income. 
A. The Nature and Growth of Predatory Lending 
Although there is no precise or universally accepted definition, preda-
tory lending is generally understood to include overpriced and excessively 
risky home mortgage loans, involving deceptive practices if not outright 
fraud.45 Such loans typically involve excessive origination fees and points, 
which can often absorb up front as much as twenty-five percent of the 
principal amount loaned.46 The lender's objective is to obligate the home-
owner to borrow more than the homeowner can afford to repay so that 
the homeowner will default and the lender will be able to foreclose 
against and then obtain the property securing the mortgage. 
Predatory lenders often target African American and Latino popula-
tions,47 and minority victims have challenged predatory lending practices 
under the federal Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination in 
home mortgage lending.48 Thus, one article on predatory lending notes: 
45. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics 
of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1259-70 (2002); Lauren E. Willis, Decision-
making & the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending, 2 n.5 (Loyola Law 
School (Los Angeles), Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2005-14, 2005), available at 
http://ssm.com/ abstract= 748286. 
46. Willis, supra note 45, at 4. 
47. ld. at 6. 
48. 42 U.s.c. § 3605 (2000) (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968); see generally Frank 
Lopez, Note, Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON Pov-
ERTY L. & POL'y 73 (1999) (advocating use of the Fair Housing Act to combat preda-
tory lending). 
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. Blackletter L. J. 10 2006
10 • HARVARD BLACKLETTER LAW JOURNAL • VOL. 22, 2006 
Predatory lenders ... target nalve people who, because of historical 
credit rationing, discrimination, the exodus of banks from inner-city 
neighborhoods, and other social and economic forces, are discon-
nected from the credit market and hence are vulnerable to preda-
tory lenders' hard-sell tactics.49 
Over the past ten years, there has been an enormous rise in predatory 
lending resulting from the large-scale securitization of home mortgage loans, 
which permits the bundling and sale of home mortgages to investors, and 
from the widespread repeal of state usury laws, which previously limited 
the amount of interest that may lawfully be charged on home mortgage 
loans.5o In addition, the tax law has contributed directly to the increase in 
predatory lending that leads to foreclosure because of tax provisions that 
favor home mortgage loans over other kinds of personal borrowing. 
Before 1986, the Internal Revenue Code permitted taxpayers to deduct 
the interest on personal loans, that is, loans incurred to finance personal 
consumption (as opposed to a business or investment) without limit.51 
The Tax Reform Act of 198652 reversed this treatment by generally deny-
ing a deduction for interest on personal consumption loans. This reversal, 
however, contained two notable exceptions for home mortgages.53 First, 
interest on up to $1 million of home mortgage loans remains deductible if 
the loans are incurred to purchase or construct a residence (so-called "ac-
quisition indebtedness").54 Second, interest on up to $100,000 of home mort-
gage loans remains deductible if the loan is obtained by pledging as secu-
rity an existing residence. 55 Thus, for example, an individual who wishes 
to borrow funds to purchase furniture can still deduct the interest if the 
loan is secured by a qualifying home mortgage, although the interest on 
an unsecured loan obtained for the same purpose is no longer deductible. 
These changes in the tax law, generally permitting the deduction of per-
sonal consumption interest only on home mortgage loans, may have in-
advertently stimulated predatory lending. 
B. Should Settlement of a Predatory Lending Claim Constitute Taxable Income? 
Predatory loans may violate both federal and state statutes designed 
to prevent abusive lending practices as well as the Fair Housing Act if the 
homeowner can show that minorities have been targeted.56 As a result, 
borrowers victimized by predatory lending may be able to reduce the ob-
ligation to repay interest and/ or principal by obtaining settlement of or 
judgment on a claim that predatory lending has violated such statutes. 
49. Engel & McCoy, supra note 45, at 1258-59 (emphasis added). 
50. See generally Willis, supra note 45, at 1-10 (examining the development of economic, 
legal, and social factors that led to the expansion of predatory lending). 
51. BI1TKER & LOKKEN, supra note 5, 'II 31.1. 
52. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
53. I.R.c. §§ 163(h)(1), 163(h)(3) (2000). 
54. ld. § 163(h)(3)(B). 
55. ld. § 163(h)(3)(C). 
56. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 45 (discussing various legal attacks on 
predatory lending, including use of the Fair Housing Act); Willis, supra note 45 (ex-
amining solutions through the "price side" and "risk side" of loan markets). 
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Longstanding income tax rules require that a borrower report as tax-
able income the amount of any forgiven debtY When a loan is made, it is 
treated as not producing income to the borrower because the cash received 
is offset by a corresponding liability, producing no net gain. For identical 
reasons, the repayment in full of a loan is treated as not producing a loss 
because the cash paid out is offset by a decrease in liabilities, resulting in 
no net loss. To illustrate, if a taxpayer borrows $10,000 to pay law school 
tuition, the taxpayer does not have income because the receipt of an asset 
(the cash) is balanced by the obligation to repay $10,000. When the tax-
payer repays the $10,000 loan, there is no loss because the decrease in as-
sets is balanced by a decrease in loan obligations. 
Suppose, however, that the lender agrees to accept $9,000 in full satis-
faction of a $10,000 loan. The $1,000 difference between what was owed 
and what was repaid (that is, the amount "forgiven") is treated as income 
to the borrower. In the case of forgiveness of debt, the decrease in assets is 
more than offset by a decrease in loan obligations. The assets are dimin-
ished by the $9,000 repaid, but liabilities have fallen by $10,000, and the 
overall effect is a $1,000 gain. 
The principle that forgiveness of debt produces taxable income, how-
ever, is subject to a number of exceptions, some of which should apply to 
predatory lending. These exceptions are discussed below. 
1. Section 108(e)(2) 
If a predatory lender agrees to forgive an obligation to pay interest 
(rather than principal), there should generally be no income tax conse-
quences to the borrower under a statutory exception to the general prin-
ciple that the forgiveness of debt produces taxable income. Section 108(e)(2) 
of the Internal Revenue Code specifically provides, "[n]o income shall be 
realized from the discharge of indebtedness to the extent that payment of 
the liability would have given rise to a deduction."s8 Thus, when interest 
that "would have given rise to a deduction" is forgiven, the forgiveness 
will not produce taxable income. Provided that the mortgage loan meets 
the requirements for interest deductibility-the taxpayer's acquisition 
indebtedness must not exceed $1 million and home equity indebtedness 
must not exceed $100,000-then the requirement of § 108(e)(2) should be 
satisfied and the forgiveness of interest should not produce taxable in-
come. Because predatory lenders typically target taxpayers of modest 
means, these conditions will usually be met. 
2. The "Disputed Liability" Doctrine 
For the reasons explained above, if the settlement of a predatory lend-
ing claim involves the forgiveness of an obligation to pay interest, the bor-
rower should generally not have to report taxable income under the ex-
ception provided by § 108(e)(2). However, if the lender forgives part of 
the principle amount of the loan, then the § 108(e)(2) exception is obvi-
ously unavailable. Nevertheless, there is some authority for the proposi-
57. § 61(a)(12). See also United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). 
58. § 108(e)(2). 
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tion that even in those circumstances forgiveness of debt does not pro-
duce taxable income if the enforceability of the liability is disputed in good 
faith, although the decisions supporting such an exception have been criti-
cized and there may be some doubt as to the applicability of these deci-
sions to the case of predatory lending. 
The origin of the disputed liability doctrine is an early depression-era 
case, N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner.59 In Sobel, the taxpayer had borrowed 
$21,700 from a bank in order to purchase shares of the bank's stock. At the 
time when the note became due, the stock was worthless. The taxpayer 
sued the bank for rescission of the original sale of stock, claiming that the 
bank had violated its promise to indemnify the corporation against loss in 
the value of the bank's stock. The claim for rescission was settled, with 
the taxpayer agreeing to pay $10,850 in full satisfaction of the $21,700 loan. 
The Commissioner asserted that the taxpayer had forgiveness of debt in-
come of $10,850, equal to the excess of the face amount of the $21,700 loan 
over the $10,850 paid in settlement of the loan obligation. The Board of Tax 
Appeals (the predecessor of the Tax Court) found that the taxpayer did 
not have forgiveness of debt income, stating that there was a "question 
whether the taxpayer bought property in 1929 and a question as to its li-
ability and the amount thereof."60 In effect, the Court found that the amount 
of the liability should be treated as the amount paid in settlement of the 
disputed claim. Thus, for tax purposes, the disputed liability was treated 
as satisfied for the full amount owed (as determined by the settlement) so 
that there was no forgiveness of debt. 
In 1990, the Third Circuit affirmed the continuing validity of the dis-
puted liability doctrine in Zarin v. Commissioner.61 An Atlantic City casino 
had advanced the taxpayer, David Zarin, $3.4 million in chips on credit, 
notwithstanding a New Jersey state gaming commission decision identi-
fying Zarin as a compulsive gambler and ordering the casino to refrain 
from issuing him additional credit. After Zarin lost the chips playing dice, 
he refused to repay the casino on the ground that the extension of credit 
violated the state gaming commission order and therefore the debt was 
unenforceable under New Jersey state law. The parties settled the disputed 
$3.4 million liability for $500,000. The Commissioner asserted that Zarin 
had forgiveness of debt income equal to the excess of the $3.4 million debt 
over the $500,000 settlement payment. The Third Circuit, citing Sobel, held 
that there was no forgiveness of debt because of the dispute over the debt's 
enforceability, stating "[w]hen a debt is unenforceable, it follows that the 
amount of the debt, and not just the liability thereon, is in dispute."62 There-
fore, the $500,000 settlement "fixed ... the amount of debt cognizable for 
tax purposes."63 
If taken literally, the Zarin decision appears to cover nearly all settle-
ments and judgments in predatory lending cases in which the enforceabil-
ity of a liability is disputed on grounds of violating federal or state laws. 
However, a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit casts doubt on the valid-
59. 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939). 
60. Id. at 1265. 
61. 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990). 
62. [d. at 116. 
63. Id. 
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ity of such a broad reading of Zarin. In Preslar v. Commissioner,64 the Tenth 
Circuit stated that the mere fact that the legality or enforceability of a debt 
was disputed was not enough to avoid income arising from forgiveness 
of debt. In addition, the amount of the debt itself must be a matter of dis-
pute in order for the disputed liability exception to apply: 
The problem with the Third Circuit's holding is it treats liquidated 
and unliquidated debts alike. The whole theory behind requiring 
that the amount of a debt be disputed before the [disputed] liabil-
ity exception can be triggered is that only in the context of dis-
puted debts is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) unaware of the 
exact consideration initially exchanged in a transaction .... The 
mere fact that a taxpayer challenges the enforceability of a debt in 
good faith does not necessarily mean he or she is shielded from 
discharge-of-indebtedness income upon resolution of the dispute. 
To implicate the [disputed] liability doctrine, the original amount 
of the debt must be unliquidated. A total denial of liability is not a 
dispute touching upon the amount of the underlying debt.65 
Confusing matters further, the Tenth Circuit added a possible excep-
tion to the unliquidated liability rule. It stated, without elaboration, that a 
dispute about a liquidated amount might not produce forgiveness of debt 
income if the debt is "tainted by fraud or material misrepresentations."66 
This exception could benefit borrowers who allege that a predatory loan 
should be modified because the lender engaged in fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or other abusive practices. However, the statement concerning the 
exception for fraud or misrepresentation was dictum. The Tenth Circuit 
did not explain the rationale for the exception, and the exception appears 
inconsistent with an authority cited with approval in another part of the 
opinion. The Tenth Circuit quoted a law review article that argued: 
Enforceability of the debt ... should not affect the tax treatment of 
the transaction. If the parties initially treated the transaction as a 
loan when the loan proceeds were received, thereby not declaring 
the receipt as income, then the transaction should be treated con-
sistently when the loan is discharged and income should be de-
clared in the amount of the discharge.67 
The rationale of the foregoing authority-that if the receipt of the loan 
does not produce income, then repayment of less than the amount re-
ceived should produce income-applies even if there has been misrepre-
sentation or fraud. This rationale also reflects the continuing position of 
the IRS that the "disputed liability" exception should be restricted to in-
stances in which the amount (rather than the enforceability) of the liabil-
ity is disputed in good faith. It is therefore uncertain whether the dis-
puted liability doctrine will permit lenders to avoid reporting taxable in-
64. 167 F,3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 1331-
67. Id. at 1329 (quoting Gregory M. Giangiordano, Taxation-Discharge of Indebtedness In-
come-Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990),64 TEMP. L. REv. 1189, 1202 
n.88 (1991». 
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come when a predatory lender forgives a loan obligation and the § 108(e)(2) 
exception for deductible interest does not apply. 
C. Possible Statutory Reform 
Given the uncertainty noted above about the disputed liability doctrine, 
it would be desirable for Congress to enact a specific exception for preda-
tory home mortgage loans to the general rule that forgiveness of debt 
produces taxable income. Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides numerous exceptions in other contexts. For example, insolvent or 
bankrupt taxpayers need not report income arising from forgiveness of 
debt,68 nor do taxpayers when the debt is associated with the acquisition 
of business real estate69 or a farming business.7o 
Homeowners subject to predatory lending are deserving of similar 
treatment. One possible difficulty would be limiting this treatment to 
situations involving predatory lending. As noted above, there is no pre-
cise or universally accepted definition of predatory lending. The general 
definition-overpriced and excessively risky home loans, involving de-
ceptive practices if not outright fraud71-may be too imprecise for distin-
guishing between predatory and non-predatory loans. A second-best so-
lution therefore may be to permit the exclusion of income arising from 
forgiveness of debt on all home mortgage 10ans.72 Since taxpayers of modest 
means are the principal targets of predatory lending, relief could be lim-
ited to mortgages associated with a taxpayer's principal place of resi-
dence (thus excluding mortgages on second homes) and the amount enti-
tled to exclusion could be capped at a relatively modest amount, e.g., 
$100,000. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF TAX-EXEMPT STATUS73 
A. Brief Overview 
A recurring issue in constitutional civil rights litigation is whether tax-
exempt status constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause or state support under the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court most recently considered the 
68. §§ 108(a)(1)(A), 108(a)(1)(8). 
69. § 108(a)(1)(D). 
70. § 108(a)(1)(C). 
71. Engel & McCoy, supra note 45, at 1259-70 (2002); Willis, supra note 45, at 2 n.5. 
72. The Internal Revenue Code generally exacts a price when income arising from for-
giveness of debt is not initially taxed. The price exacted is a reduction in the basis of 
associated property (or in the tax attributes of the associated business) so that the un-
taxed gain will be preserved for possible taxation at some later time. § 108(b)(1). If 
income arising from forgiveness of a predatory home mortgage loan were excluded 
from taxation, the basis of the home associated with the loan could be similarly re-
duced. However, in this case, such basis reduction is unlikely to lead to taxation of the 
gain at a later date because of § 121, which permits married taxpayers filing jointly to 
exclude from taxation $500,000 of the gain on the sale of a principal residence, and 
Single taxpayers to exclude $250,000. 
73. The analysis is based in part on a previous article by one of the authors. See Stephen 
Cohen, Exempt Status for Segregated Schools: Does the Constitution Permit Lower Stan-
dards for Tax Benefits than for Direct Grants?, 17 TAX NOTES 259 (1982). 
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issue, albeit indirectly, in United States v. Virginia/4 a case in which the Court 
held that the Equal Protection Clause requires the Virginia Military Insti-
tute, a military college financed by and subject to the control of the state 
of Virginia, to admit female applicants. 
It was direct state funding rather than tax-exempt status that raised 
the equal protection issue in the Virginia case. Nevertheless, during oral 
argument counsel for Virginia argued that if the Constitution requires a 
military college financed and controlled by the state of Virginia to admit 
women, then it also requires Wellesley College to admit men or lose its fed-
eral tax-exempt status.75 Similarly, in dissenting from the Court's decision 
in Virginia, Justice Scalia wrote that "it is certainly not beyond the Court 
that rendered today's decision to hold that a [tax deductible] donation to 
a single-sex college should be deemed contrary to public policy and there-
fore not deductible if the college discriminates on the basis of sex."76 
In fact, the Court has avoided equating the benefit of tax-exempt status 
with direct funding, at least under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. In Walz v. Tax Commission,?? a taxpayer asserted that the New 
York State property tax exemption for churches violated the Establish-
ment Clause.78 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger upheld the ex-
emption as permissible state support for religion/9 while hinting that a 
direct outlay would not be constitutionapo To distinguish the exemption 
from a direct outlay, the Court relied primarily on two historical facts.81 
The Court argued that the drafters of the Constitution saw no incompati-
bility between the religion clauses and existing exemptions for churches,82 
and that the exemption had been considered constitutional for the na-
tion's entire history.83 
74. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107). 
76. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
77. 397 U.s. 664 (1970). 
78. Id. at 667. 
79. Id. at 674-75. 
80. Id. at 675. 
81. Id. at 676-79. 
82. Walz, 397 U.S. at 676-79. 
83. Id. The exemption was also distinguished as being merely "indirect" and thus in-
volving no actual disbursement of funds and few administrative entanglements. Id. 
at 674-75. These particular reasons for the distinction are not very satisfactory. 
Whether a taxpayer pays more to the tax collector, but receives a check from a differ-
ent agency---or simply pays less in taxes-seems a distinction without a difference. 
Moreover, a direct outlay can be designed to impose few administrative burdens on 
the beneficiary. The degree of entanglement depends on how it is structured, not 
whether the program is on the direct outlay or tax side. 
One commentary on Walz noted: 
[Pjerhaps aware that the sheer force of logic behind these propositions [regard-
ing indirectness and administrative entanglementj is not overwhelming, the 
Court unwraps the still-serviceable, if somewhat abused, argument that "a page 
of history is worth a volume of logic," and then proceeds to recite over four 
pages of historical data. The Court's history demonstrates that, as a matter of le-
gal theory, the tax exemption of church property and the establishment clause 
have always been deemed compatible and that, as a matter of historical fact, this 
practice has not led to the entrenchment of religion in our national polity. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. Blackletter L. J. 16 2006
16 • HARVARD BLACKLETTER LAW JOURNAL. VOL. 22, 2006 
Of course, what constitutes impermissible government support under 
the Establishment Clause does not necessarily determine what constitutes 
such support under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has never di-
rectly addressed the question of whether tax-exempt status constitutes 
state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, although a lower 
Equal Protection threshold, at least when the issue is racial discrimination 
in education, is implied by decisions involving exempt status for racially 
segregated private schools.84 
In 1969, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights filed Green v. Ken-
nedy, an action on behalf of black schoolchildren in Mississippi challeng-
ing under the Equal Protection Clause the constitutionality of the grant of 
exempt status under the federal income tax to racially discriminatory pri-
vate schools.85 On January 12, 1970, a special three-judge federal court is-
sued a preliminary injunction ordering the IRS to withhold exempt status 
from racially segregated schools in Mississippi.86 In July 1970, the IRS an-
nounced a policy of denying exempt status to all racially segregated pri-
vate schools nationwide.87 One year later the Green court issued a final opin-
ion interpreting the Internal Revenue Code as not granting exempt status 
to racially discriminatory private schools.88 
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Harold Leventhal gave three rea-
sons for this conclusion. First, under the common law, an organization 
whose activities are illegal or contrary to public policy is not entitled to 
privileges and immunities ordinarily afforded to charities.89 If Fagin's 
school for pickpockets could not qualify as a charitable trust, then neither 
should a racially segregated private school.9° Thus, "[i]f we were to follow 
the common law approach," the Code would be interpreted to deny ex-
empt status in such cases.91 Second, the Internal Revenue Code "must be 
construed and applied in consonance with the Federal public policy 
against support for racial segregation of schools, public or private."92 The 
numerous "sources and evidences of that Federal public policy" included 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Brown and its progeny, and 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.93 Third, any other construction "would raise 
serious constitutional questions" and flit would be difficult indeed to es-
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., et al., Property Tax Exemptions for Charitable, Educational, Religious, 
and Governmental Institutions in Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REV. 181,203 (1971) (footnotes 
omitted). 
84. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164, 1165 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. 
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
85. The named defeJldant, David Kennedy, was Secretary of the Treasury. After he was 
replaced by John Connally, the case was retitled Green v. Connally and is commonly 
referred to by that name. Because of the claim that a federal statute was being ap-
plied in violation of the Constitution, a three judge federal court was convened un-
der 28 U.s.c. §§ 2282, 2284 (1976). 
86. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970). 
87. I.R.S. News Releases Guly 10 & July 19, 1970), reprinted in [1970] 7 Standard Fed. Tax 
Rep. (CCH) 'R'R 6,790, 6,814. 
88. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DD.C. 1971). 
89. Id. at 1157-59. 
90. Id. at 1160. 
91. Id. at 1161. 
92. Id. at 1163. 
93. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1163. 
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tablish that such [tax] support can be provided consistently with the Con-
stitution."94 On appeal, Green was affirmed (albeit summarily) by the Su-
preme Court.95 
The third ground for the decision in Green-that the Code has to be 
construed to deny exempt status to racially segregated private schools in 
order to avoid a serious constitutional issue-suggests that had the three-
judge court and the Supreme Court faced rather than avoided the issue, 
they would have decided that exempt status for racially segregated pri-
vate schools is unconstitutional state support in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 
Twelve years later, the Reagan administration tried to reverse the 
Green decision by administrative fiat. On January 8, 1982, the IRS, aban-
doning existing policy, declared that it would henceforth grant tax ex-
emptions to racially segregated private schools because it had no legal 
authority under the Internal Revenue Code to deny exemptions to ra-
cially discriminatory institutions.96 In addition, the government asked the 
Supreme Court to vacate, as "moot," Bob Jones University v. United States97 
and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States,98 two pending cases in 
which racially discriminatory private schools were challenging denials of 
tax-exempt status.99 
Shortly thereafter, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia enjoined the IRS from granting exemptions to any racially segre-
gated school, including Bob Jones and Goldsboro.loo The government then 
withdrew the suggestion of mootness in the two Supreme Court cases.lOl 
In its decision in Bob Jones University v. United States,t°2 the Court con-
strued the Internal Revenue Code not to permit tax-exempt status to an 
institution whose practices contravene fundamental public policy. Find-
ing that racially segregated education is contrary to such policy, the Court 
held that the IRS was authorized by the Internal Revenue Code to deny 
tax-exempt status to racially segregated schools. Because of the statutory 
authority for the IRS denial of tax-exempt status to racially segregated 
private schools, the Court did not need, or choose, to address the question 
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also 
requires that result. 
94. Id. at 1164-65. 
95. Coit v. Green, 404 U.s. 997 (1971). 
96. Press Release, U.s. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Establishes New Tax-Exempt Policy 
Gan. 8, 1982), reprinted in Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax 
Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 97th Congo 607-08 (1982) [hereinafter Policy Change Hearings]. 
97. 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
98. 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
99. Memorandum for the United States, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 
(1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3), rqJrinted in Policy Change Hearings, supra note 96, at 612-14. 
100. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737 (1984). 
101. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Schools Tax Issue Put to High Court in Shift by Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
26, 1982, at AI. 
102. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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B. Exempt Status and the Fourteenth Amendment 
The following Section discusses whether the Constitution prohibits 
tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools, as well as 
for single-sex colleges. As noted above, neither Green nor Bob Jones di-
rectly confronted the question whether exempt status for racially segre-
gated private schools would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the issue of whether and when exempt 
status invokes the obligation not to discriminate could easily arise again, 
particularly if, as Justice Scalia suggested in his Virginia dissent, exempt 
status for a women-only college such as Wellesley offends the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
First, we analyze the principal objection offered by tax policy theorists 
to treating tax-exempt status as imposing equal protection obligations: 
that exempt status should not be regarded as providing a special financial 
benefit because it is consistent with measuring income and therefore is 
not functionally equivalent to a subsidy. Second, we discuss whether the 
Supreme Court's decision in Walz v. Commissioner, holding that exempt 
status for churches does not violate the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause, implies that exempt status for racially segregated private schools 
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 
Finally, we argue that notwithstanding our conclusion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits exempt status for racially segregated private schools, 
and notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia, exempt 
status can be constitutionally provided in most instances to single-sex pri-
vate educational institutions. 
1. The Income-Measurement Argument 
A number of tax theorists have argued that the charitable contribution 
deduction is consistent with measuring taxpayers' income and therefore 
should not be regarded as providing a special financial benefit or as func-
tionally equivalent to a subsidy.103 Since the deduction does not provide a 
special benefit or subsidy, it cannot violate either the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause.104 This argument raises the question whether it is reasonable to 
consider the charitable deduction as an income-measurement provision. 
103. See generally William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. 
L. REv. 309, 346-74 (1972) (deduction for charitable contributions is consistent with 
measuring income and is not functionally equivalent to direct subsidy for charitable 
giving); Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 
28 TAX L. REv. 37,46-49 (1972) (deduction for charitable contributions is not func-
tionally equivalent to direct subSidy for charitable giving). 
104. See generally Boris 1. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitu-
tionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 61-63 (1972) (exempt status is 
not functionally equivalent to a subSidy). For a recent argument that tax-exempt status 
cannot violate the Fourteenth Amendment unless Congress specifically intended to 
discriminate, see Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 
HAsTINGS L.J. 407 (1999) (arguing that tax-exempt status for segregated private schools 
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). For a more 
general analysis of whether special tax provisions should be regarded as providing 
special financial benefits that raise constitutional questions, see Edward A. Zlinsky, 
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The primary reason for a private school to seek exempt status is so 
that donors can deduct gifts to the school as charitable contributions. lOS 
Most private educational institutions lack. net income because receipts are 
generally more than offset by expenses. The attorney for Bob Jones and 
Goldsboro confirmed this explanation during congressional hearings: 
I know of no religious school today which has a nickel to spare. 
Their resources are only as deep as their parishioners' pockets .... 
[T]he tax exemption becomes pretty important because [of] the 
deductibility of a contribution .... 106 
The income-measurement argument starts with the generally accepted 
standard, the Haig-Simons definition: 
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the mar-
ket value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in 
the value of the store of property rights between the beginning 
and end of the period in question.107 
Income, in other words, equals the value of what is consumed plus what 
is saved. Since donations are neither consumed nor saved by the donor, 
they are not income to the donor and must be deducted from the donor's 
tax base. The contributions are actually used up only by the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the charity. lOS 
However, the donor's consumption can be defined to include the sat-
isfaction derived from making a charitable donation, and the value of such 
satisfaction might equal at least part of the value of the gift. It is therefore 
arguable whether a full deduction for charitable contributions is consis-
tent with measuring the donor's income. "When they tum their attention 
to charitable contributions, tax economists almost uniformly argue that 
these are consumption expenditures from which the donor gets what he 
pays for, viz., personal satisfaction undiminished by the fact that the re-
cipients also benefit from his generosity."I09 
Even conceding this point, it is not enough to focus solely on the donor; 
the income-measurement issue requires considering the tax treatment of 
both donor and recipient together. If the donor does not benefit from the 
gift and is therefore entitled to a deduction, then logically there should be 
income to the ultimate beneficiary who consumes it. Yet the beneficiary 
never reports the item because § 102(a) permits donees to exclude all gifts 
in computing taxable income. The beneficiary's gift exclusion combines 
with the donor's charitable deduction to result in the income represented 
by the donation never being taxed. The non-taxation of both donor and 
Are Tax Benefits Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
379 (1998). 
105. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Congo 254 (1979) (statement of Jerome Kurtz, I.R.S. 
Commissioner). 
106. [d. at 287, 302 (statement of William Ball). 
107. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). 
108. Andrews, supra note 103, at 346; Bittker, supra note 103, at 59. 
109. CHARLES O. GALVIN & BORIS I. BITfI(ER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD 
IT BE? 53-54 (1969). 
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donee is consistent with income measurement only when the ultimate bene-
ficiaries of the gift are too poor to owe taxes. This condition might be 
satisfied if charitable deductions today were limited to the category of "relief 
of the poor," but it is doubtful that the condition is more than occasionally 
met by the ultimate beneficiaries of tax-exempt status for schools, who are 
the students and the parents of students attending private schools. l1° 
Another version of the income-measurement argument views the chari-
table deduction as income-defining because it is needed to equalize the 
tax treatment of a donor who contributes cash or property with a donor 
who makes a gift of his or her own services.111 Consider a doctor and a 
lawyer, both of whom wish to contribute to a hospital. The doctor works five 
hours per week on the wards without pay. Because his contribution takes 
the form of imputed income from services, the donation is disregarded in 
determining his taxable income. The lawyer contributes the fees from five 
hours of legal work. His position is like the doctor's except that he do-
nates income in non-imputed cash form, which means that it must be re-
ported as income. In order to treat the lawyer the same as the doctor, an 
offsetting deduction for the cash donation might be allowed. But as a 
general rule we do not correct for differences in treatment caused by non-
taxation of imputed income. If a lawyer pays someone else to write a will 
or a baker buys another's cakes, no deduction is allowed for the expendi-
ture even though each might have consumed his own services and thereby 
realized no taxable income. 
The income-measurement view also appears at odds with the general 
rule (to which the charitable deduction is a clear exception) that ordinary 
gifts may not be deducted. ll2 Why do gifts to the Red Cross and Yale Uni-
versity reduce the donor's Haig-Simons income, but not gifts to a Political 
Action Committee or a favorite nephew? Gifts to ordinary donees are, in 
the same sense, neither saved nor consumed by the donor. And the gen-
eral rule is not considered to cause over-taxation even if the donor is in a 
higher tax bracket than the donee or if a disparity exists vis-a-vis donors 
who make gifts of imputed income. 
The critical problem for proponents of the income-measurement view 
is to justify special treatment for charitable gifts when ordinary gifts are 
not deductible. They appear to rely primarily on the idea that gifts to charity, 
110. See Andrews, supra note 103, at 356-57: 
Many contributions are to private schools, whose student bodies are probably 
still disproportionately representative of the affluent part of the population. 
Cf Boris I. Bittker & William K. Raedhert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations 
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 334 (1976): 
[T]he students who attend exempt schools ... probably come from higher in-
come classes than most of the beneficiaries of other charitable organizations .... 
[I]t weakens one argument in favor of exempting many other nonprofit organi-
zations-that the burden of a tax would fall largely on persons at the bottom of 
the income ladder. 
111. See Andrews, supra note 103, at 352-54; Bittker, supra note 103, at 59-60. 
112. Ordinary gifts are considered personal consumption expenses, which are not de-
ductible under § 262. 
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unlike gifts to relatives or friends that finance private consumption, sat-
isfy a moral obligation or provide desirable public goods: 
[C]haritable contributions represent a [moral] claim of such a high 
priority that ... a case can be made for excluding them in deter-
mining the amount of income at the voluntary disposal of the tax-
payer in question .... Side by side with taxpayers who can satisfy 
their charitable impulses by making a contribution of their time ... 
are others who feel the same charitable impulse, but must dis-
charge their moral obligation by contributing cash or property.ll3 
Almost all charitable organizations other than those that distribute 
alms to the poor produce something in the nature of common or 
social goods or services. The benefit produced by a contribution to 
a private school, for example .... [T]he product is essentially a 
common good . . .. [T]he ultimate benefits from schooling flow 
beyond the immediate recipients. General education makes better 
citizens .... 114 
In the end, whether or not we consider the charitable deduction gener-
ally to be an income-measurement provision depends on a whole range of 
value judgments, all of which are debatable. However, unless racially seg-
regated education is deemed to serve a moral goal or provide a desirable 
public good, then a critical premise of the income-measurement view (that 
may be appropriate in other contexts) is not valid in the specific case of 
gifts to racially segregated private schools. The income-measurement view 
of the charitable deduction therefore does not pose an obstacle to treating 
exempt status as a subsidy involving Fourteenth Amendment state action. 
2. The Significance ofWalz 
Does the decision in Walz v. Commissioner, that tax-exempt status for 
churches is permitted by the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, 
imply that tax-exempt status for racially segregated private schools is per-
mitted by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? As 
noted above, the Supreme Court held in Walz that tax exemptions for re-
ligious institutions do not violate the Establishment Clause because the 
exemption had been considered constitutional for the nation's entire history. 
However, history has an altogether different significance when the 
beneficiary of exempt status is a racially segregated school. At the time of 
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, almost all public and pri-
vate schools were racially segregated. The Equal Protection Clause was 
not generally understood at the time as a bar either to racially segregated 
113. Bittker, supra note 103, at 59-60. 
114. Andrews, supra note 103, at 357, 359; cf Bittker, supra note 103, at 61: 
[T]he deduction can be viewed as a mechanism for permitting the taxpayer to 
direct ... the social functions to be supported by his tax payments .... [T]he de-
duction gives the taxpayer a chance to divert funds which would otherwise be 
spent as Washington determines and to allocate them to other socially approved 
functions. 
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public education or to tax-exempt status for racially segregated private 
schools.ll5 Yet the equal protection obligations of the Constitution have 
expanded along with increasing awareness of the evils of racial discrimi-
nation in education and have never been frozen by nineteenth-century atti-
tudes. If historical practice does not make the segregation of public 
schools constitutional, neither can it justify exempt status for private institu-
tions that discriminate. 
Moreover, the affirmative reasons for holding in Walz that church ex-
emptions do not violate the First Amendment have little relevance to equal 
protection analysis of exemptions for private schools. On the one hand, 
the Court admitted that the exemption does provide a financial benefit, 
thereby tending to establish churches.116 However, removing the exemp-
tion might entangle the government in church affairs, as tax collectors 
pore over financial records and church and state become embroiled in tax 
disputes. ll7 Since taxation could be used to oppress religion, the "exemp-
tion constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those 
dangers."118 Walz is the product of two competing constitutional values of 
equal stature, prohibiting both government support for, and government 
interference with, religion. 
In the equal protection area, there are also competing values between 
the policy that forbids state support for racially segregated education and 
rights of privacy and association, including the right to attend a racially 
segregated private school. But in this case, the competing values are not 
of equal stature. The policy against support for racial discrimination in edu-
cation is valued more highly than the right to send one's children to schools 
that discriminate. 
The constitutional balance is very different here than in Walz, primar-
ily because racially segregated schools occupy a much lower constitutional 
status than do churches: 
[A]lthough the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places 
no value on discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the 
Free Exercise Clause. Invidious private discrimination may be char-
acterized as a form of exercising freedom of association ... but it 
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. ll9 
Thus, the holding in Walz that permits tax benefits to churches should not 
be extended to equal protection analysis of exempt status for racially dis-
criminatory private schools. 
115. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 633-34 (1976) (explaining how in 1868, for 
example, in the North, segregated schools were permitted in eight states, and in an-
other five states public education was made entirely unavailable to black children). 
116. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.s. 664, 674-75 (1970). 
117. Id. at 674. 
118. Id. at 673. 
119. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973). 
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3. Does Exempt Status for Wellesley Also Violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment? 
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits exempt status for racially segregated private schools, and notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia, can exempt status be 
constitutionally provided to single-sex private educational institutions? 
The constitutional status of whites-only private schools is vastly different 
from that of single-sex educational institutions. Although in Bob Jones, the 
Supreme Court cited the "unmistakably clear" agreement among "all three 
branches of the Federal Government" that racial discrimination must be 
eliminated,120 there is no evidence of a similar hostility to single-sex edu-
cational institutions. Thus, an amicus brief in the Virginia case contrasted 
racially segregated education with single-sex education to counter the 
suggestion that if a military college financed by, and subject to the control 
of, the state of Virginia is required to admit female applicants, then Wellesley 
College must admit men or lose its federal tax-exempt status: 
The three branches of the federal government have not, acting in-
dependently or in concert, articulated a position against, much less 
launched a crusade to dismantle, private single-sex colleges .... 
In short, there is no "fundamental public policy" or "declared po-
sition of the whole Government" which the maintenance or estab-
lishment of private single-gender undergraduate college programs 
contravenes .... Moreover ... the evidence is clear and well-estab-
lished that single-sex education for women is particularly effective 
in preparing them for leadership and success, generally, and in male-
dominated fields, more particularly.121 
As the Court noted in Virginia, it has "reserved most stringent judicial scru-
tiny for classifications based on race or national origin .... "122 
In addition, there is a vast difference between the kind of support af-
forded the Virginia Military Institute-the college was largely financed 
and controlled by the state of Virginia-and the less extensive and intru-
sive support afforded by tax-exempt status. The Court's opinion in Vir-
ginia noted the special circumstances of the case, addressing "specifically 
and only an educational opportunity recognized ... as 'unique,' ... an 
opportunity available only at Virginia's premier military institute, the Com-
monwealth's sole single-sex public university or college."123 
Of course, depending on the context and the myriad of different ways 
that single-sex education might be implemented, it is conceivable that in 
special circumstances, tax-exempt status for a single-sex private educa-
tional institution might offend the Equal Protection Clause. In the absence 
of special circumstances, however, the Fourteenth Amendment should 
permit an all-men's (as well as an all-women's) college to benefit from tax-
120. 461 U.S. at 59B. 
121. Brief for Twenty-Six Private Women's Colleges as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.s. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107),1995 WL 
702837,at*23,*25. 
122. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.s. 515, 532 n.6 (1996). 
123. [d. at 533 n.7. 
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exempt status-even though more intrusive government financing and 
control of the kind in the Virginia case would raise equal protection issues 
and despite the fact that racially segregated private schools should ordi-
narily not be permitted to receive exempt status given the especially high 
constitutional value placed on ending racial discrimination in education. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of first impression, civil rights and taxation may appear to 
be unrelated subjects. However, on closer examination, civil rights lawyers 
need to be aware of potential tax implications of civil rights litigation to a 
surprising degree. Whenever money damages are sought in civil rights 
litigation, the tax treatment of damages will affect the amount that actu-
ally benefits the plaintiff after taxes. In addition, even when litigation 
seeks non-money damages, as in predatory lending cases, civil rights law-
yers need to attempt to structure the relief so that it does not cause unde-
sirable tax consequences, such as income arising from forgiveness of debt. 
In our final example, civil rights lawyers may need to analyze the financial 
and other consequences of tax benefits, such as tax-exempt status, in or-
der to ascertain whether such benefits raise issues under the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
